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The Cultural Shaping of Compassion

Birgit Koopmann-Holm and Jeanne L. Tsai

Abstract
In this chapter, we first review the existing literature on cross-cultural studies on compassion. While
cultural similarities exist, we demonstrate cultural differences in the conception, experience, and
expression of compassion. Then we present our own work on the cultural shaping of compassion by
introducing Affect Valuation Theory (e.g., Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006), our theoretical framework. We
show how the desire to avoid feeling negative partly explains cultural differences in conceptualizations
and expressions of compassion. Specifically, the more people want to avoid feeling negative, the more
they focus on the positive (e.g., comforting memories) than the negative (e.g., the pain of someone's
death) when responding to others' suffering, and the more they regard responses as helpful that focus
on the positive (vs. negative). Finally, we discuss implications of our work for counseling, health care, and
public service settings, as well as for interventions that aim to promote compassion.
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In The Descent ofMan, and Selection in Relation
to Sex, Charles Darwin described the feeling of concern about another person's suffering (i.e., compassion), as a basic human instinct that composed the
"noblest part ofour nature" (Darwin, 1871 , p. 162).
While increasing research suggests that experiences
of compassion are associated with greater psychological well-being and prosocial behavior (e.g. ,
Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Condon &
DeSteno, 2011; Hofmann, Grossman, & Hinton,
2011 ; Neff, Hsieh, & Dejitterat, 2005; Neff,
Kirkpatrick, & Rude, 2007; Pace et al., 2009), most
of this research has focused on Western samples. As
a result, we still know relatively little about the role
that culture plays in the conception, experience,
and expression of compassion, which has implications for which aspects of compassion are "basic"
and "instinctual" (Wuthnow, 2012, p. 306). In
line with the other chapters in this Handbook, we
define "compassion" as sensitivity to the pain or
suffering of another person, coupled with a deep
desire to alleviate that suffering (Goetz, Keltner, &

Simon-Thomas, 2010). However, because previous
researchers have used other terms (e.g., "sympathy,"
"empathy," "altruism") to refer to states and behaviors that overlap with and are related to compassion,
we refer to studies that focus on these states as well.
In this chapter, we review the existing cross-cultural
research on compassion and then describe our own
work in the area. But first, we describe what we
mean by "culture."

What Is Culture?
By "culture," we refer to socially transmitted
and historically derived ideas that are instantiated in shared practices, products, and institutions
(Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). Cultural ideas provide individuals with a framework for how to be a
good person (Shweder, 1991), and by engaging in
this framework, individuals recreate this framework
for others (Markus & Kitayama, 2010). This process is called "the mutual constitution of cultures and
selves" (Markus & Kirayama, 2010) or the "culture
cycle" (Markus & Conner, 2013). For example,
2 73

women's magazines contain advertisements with
models that reflect the beauty ideals of the advertisers. Readers of these magazines may at least to
some degree consciously or unconsciously internalize these beauty ideals. Consequently, they may try
to emulate these ideals by purchasing clothes and
other products that reflect the ideals. Furthermore,
readers may consciously or unconsciously use these
ideals when judging the beauty of others.
Culture not only shapes ideals of beauty, but
also ideals of emotion (Markus & Kitayama, 201 0).
The "cultural construction" approach to emotion
(Boiger & Mesquita, 2012) argues that people's cultural contexts shape their emotions by providing a
framework for interpreting each emotional episode.
For example, in a cultural context like the United
States, in which people are encouraged to influence
others, excitement, enthusiasm, and other higharousal positive states are viewed as desirable, in part
because being excited helps individuals change their
environments to be consistent with their desires,
beliefs, and preferences (Tsai, Knutson, & Fung,
2006; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, Fung, & Yeung, 2007).
Thus, in many U.S. contexts, people are encouraged
to show and express their excitement and enthusiasm, and people who show these states are rated
more positively (Sims &Tsai, 2015). In contrast, in
East Asian contexts, in which people are encouraged
to adjust to others, calm, peacefulness, and other
low-arousal positive states are viewed as desirable
in part because being calm helps individuals attend
to their environments and ultimately change their
own desires, beliefs, and preferences to be consistent with those of others. Thus, in many East Asian
contexts, people are encouraged to show and express
their calm and peacefulness, and people who show
these states are rated more positively (Tsai, Blevins,

Bencharit, Chim, Yeung, & Fun g, under review) .
Consequently, experiences and expressions of
excitement may mean something_ different in East
Asia n vs. U.S. contexts.
In this chapter, we argue that cultures shape different aspects of compassion (for a discussion of
different factors that might bring abo ut cultural differences in compassion, see Chiao, Chapter 12 this
volume). More specifically, we propose that cultu re
may shape how people conceptualize compassion
(i.e. , which feelings, thoughts, and behaviors people view as being compassionate/helpful), experience compassion (i.e., how people feel when they
see others suffering), and express compassion (i .e.,
what people do when they see others suffering) , as
illustrated in Figure 21.1. Here we focus on the specific case in which cultu ral differences in views of
negative affect shape how individuals conceptualize
and express compassion. At the end of the chapter,
we discuss the implications of these cultural differences for cross-cultural counseling, health care, and
public service.

What Do We Know About Compassion
Across Cultures?
First we will review existing cross-cultural studies of the conception, experience, and expression of
compassion and related states, which demonstrate
cultural similarities and differences.

Conception
Across different cultures, people conceive of
compassion and other related states (e.g., sympathy, empathy) as emotional (e.g., Shaver, Murdaya,
& Fraley, 2001). At the same time, cultures also
appear to differ in what is construed as being compassionate. For instance, most Western concepts of
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compassion assume that people should feel the most
compassion for people whom they can identify with(Batson , O 'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983),
whose perspectives they can share (Toi & Batson,
1982), and whom they feel similar to (Batson,
Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981;
Batson , Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987). In contrast,
Buddhist conceptions of compassion assume that
everyone and everything is interconnected (Dalai
Lama, 1997), and therefore, people should be able
to feel compassion towards all beings, including
adversaries and transgressors.
Differences in the conceptualization of compassion and related states have been demonstrated
berween independent and interdependent cultural contexts. For instance, K.itayama and Markus
(2000) found that feelings of social engagement
like sympathy (being concerned and feeling sorry
about someone's suffering) are more strongly associated with feeling good in Japanese than in American
samples. In another set of studies (Davis, 1980; Siu
& Shek, 2005), participants completed a commonly used measure to assess trait empathy (i.e., the
ability to identify, share, and understand another's
emotions) (Interpersonal Reactivity Index [IRI];
Davis, 1980). For English speakers, four aspects of
empathy emerged (fantasy [the tendency to imagine
the feelings of fictitious characters], perspective-taking [the tendency to adopt another's point of view],
empathic concern [the tendency co experience feelings of concern and sympathy for ochers], and personal distress [the tendency co feel anxiety when
ochers are suffering] ; Davis, 1980) . While fantasy
and personal distress also emerged for Chinese
speakers, perspective-caking and empathic concern
comprised one factor, suggesting less of a distinction berween cognitive and emotional aspects of
empathy for Chinese speakers (Siu & Shek, 2005).
Similarly, another study examined che factor structure of the IRI in a Chilean sample (Fernandez,
Dufey, & Kramp, 2011) and found no correlation
berween perspective-caking and personal distress for
male participants. Together, these data suggest chat
che distinction berween cognitive and emotional
aspects of empathy may vary within culcures.
Cultures also vary in what chey regard as "altruistic" (i.e., as an act of helping someone for his/
her sake while disregarding one's own needs). For
instance, while helping ochers is generally regarded
as a moral ace in the United Scares and India, for
Americans, a spontaneous act of helping is associated
with more altruistic motivation than a reciprocal ace
of helping. For Hindu Indians, however, alcruiscic

motivation is associated with both types of helping behavior to sim ilar degrees (Miller & Bersoff,
1994) . Together, these studies suggest char culcure
may shape people's conceptions of compassion and
ocher related scares.

Experience
Several studies suggest char the elicicors of sympathy are similar across cultures: people feel sympathy for others who suffer for reasons chat are beyond
their control (e.g., Zhang, Xia, & Li, 2007) . In
German, Israeli, Indonesian, and Malaysian contexts, children expressed sympathy (e.g., they lifted
their inner eyebrows and spoke in a soft voice) for
targets who are sad because they have lose a treasured
coy (Trommsdorff, Friedlmeier, & Mayer, 2007).
Moreover, feeling sympathy seems co have simi lar
consequences across cultures. For instance, in North
American and Brazilian children, feeling sympathy
led to greater reports of helping behavior (e.g., giving money to a stranger in need) (Eisenberg, Z hou,
& Koller, 2001).
Empathy for another person's pain has been
linked to specific patterns of brain activity across
different cultures (e.g., similar patterns of brain
activation in the left inferior frontal cortex and the
left insula; de Greek et al. , 2012; C. Jiang, Varnum,
Hou, & Han, 2014). Differences, however, have
also been observed (e.g., de Greek et al., 2012;
C. Jiang ec al., 2014) (for a description of cultural
neuroscience, see Chiao, C ha peer 12 chis volume).
For example, whereas Chinese participants showed
a pattern of brain activity suggesting char chey
were regulating their emotions when empathizing
with a fami liar angry target, German participants
showed a pattern of brain activity suggesting that
they were assuming the perspective of che angry
target (de Greek er al., 2012). Furthermore, compared co European American participants, Korean
participants, who value social hierarchy more than
European Americans, showed a greater empathic
neural response in the left cemporoparietal junction for in-group compared co our-group members
experiencing emotional pain (Cheon et al., 2011;
see also Chiao, Chapter 12 chis volume).
The experiential consequences of empathy
also appear to differ across culcures. For instance,
J. Park, Haslam, Kashima, and Norasakkunkic
(2015) found that while empathy reduces che focus
on oneself in Japan , it does not in Australia. More
specifically, chey examined the self-humanizing
bias, which is the bias to see oneself as more human
than ocher people on average. After recalling having
KOOPMANN-HOLM AND TSAI
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empathized with someone else, Japanese were less
likely than Australians to show the self-humanizing
bias. In other words, experiencing empathy resulted
in the Japanese focusing less on themselves and seeing human attributes in others more than it did for
the Australians O. Park et al. , 2015).
Findings from another set of studies (Arkins,
Uskul, & Cooper, 2016) revealed that British participants showed more empathic concern than East
Asian participants, whereas East Asian participants
showed more empathic accuracy (the skill to correctly identify other people's feelings and thoughts)
than British participants when witnessing others' social pain. One possible explanation for the
findings regarding empathic accuracy is that more
empathic concern among British participants might
have interfered with empathic accuracy, as emotions
can interfere with cognitive tasks (Arkins et al.,
2016). Alternatively, it could be that empathy is
more other-focused among East Asians, so they are
first just trying to understand how the other person
is feeling before showing empathic concern. The
findings regarding empathic concern are consistent
with ocher findings that Western adolescents and
yo ung adults reported more empathic concern when
confronted with someone's suffering than did East
Asian adolescents and young adults (Cassels, -Chan,
Chung, & Birch, 2010; Trommsdorff, 1995).
Finally, because cultural ideas can . be instantiated in practices (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952),
ocher studies examined culture in terms of cultural
or religious practices like meditation. These studies
demonstrated increased empathy (Lutz, BrefczynskiLewis, Johnstone, & Davidson, 2008; Shapiro,
Schwartz, & Bonner, 1998), social connectedness
(Hutcherson, Seppala, & Gross, 2008), as well as
hope and optimism for another (Koopmann-Holm,
Sze, & Tsai, in preparation) for individuals who
meditate. Together, these studies suggest that while
the elicitors of compassion and related states may be
similar, various aspects of the experience of compassion may differ across cultures.

Expression
Relatively less research has focused on the
expression of compassion and related states. One
study found that sympathetic touches can be distinguished from other emotional touches. Hertenstein
and colleagues (Hertenstein, Keltner, App, Bulleit,
& Jaskolka, 2006) asked participants in the United
States and Spain to touch other participants' arms in
ways that communicated specific emotions, without
seeing or talking to each other. Using a forced-choice

response format, participants in the U.S. and Spain
were able to differentiate sympathetic touches (patting followed by stroking) from angry, afraid, disgusted, surprised, loving, and grateful ones.
Other studies suggest that certain cultural ideas
and practices increase the likelihood that people will
express compassion. For example, engaging in meditation appears to increase expressions of compassion (e.g., Condon, Desbordes, Miller, & DeSreno,
2013; Kemeny et al ., 2012; Leiberg, Klimecki, &
Singer, 2011; Weng et al., 2013). Condon and colleagues (2013) found that participants who were
randomly assigned to an eight-week meditation
course (versus a no-intervention control group)
were more likely to offer their chair to a person on
crutches.
In perhaps one of the largest cross-national studies
of expressions of compassion, Levine, Norenzayan,
and Philbrick (2001) examined how people in 23
nations around the world responded to situations in
which strangers needed help (e.g., a person who has
dropped a pen, a person with a hurt leg, a blind person who is trying to cross the street). People from
nations with a tradition of simpatia (the tendency
of being concerned about ocher's well-being and of
fostering harmony in relationships, which is highly
valued in Latino culture), such as Brazil and Costa
Rica, were more likely to help others in these situations than people from nations without a tradition
of simpatia such Singapore and Malaysia (Levine
eral.,2001).
In that study, people from poorer nations (e.g.,
Malawi and India) were also more likely to help
others than those from wealthier nations such as the
Netherlands and the United States. These findings
are consistent with work by Stellar, Manzo, Kraus,
and Keltner (2012) demonstrating that within the
United States, individuals of lower socioeconomic
status reported feeling more compassionate towards
a peer undergoing a stressful job interview than did
those of higher socioeconomic status. These social
class differences and differences between poorer
and wealthier nations are likely also due to culture:
Compared to higher socioeconomic contexts, lower
socioeconomic contexts endorse more "interdependent" models of self, which encourage individuals to be more sensitive and responsive to the needs
of others (Snibbe & Markus, 2005) .
One main limitation of the study by Levine
et al. (2001), however, is that it assumes that the
expressions ot' compassion are similar across cultures. For instance, Levine et al. (2001) assumed
that helping a blind person cross the street is a
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compassionate acc. Again, chis might depend on
how individualistic or collecciviscic the culcure is.
In cultures char promote independence (individualistic cultures), helping a blind person across the
street may undermine char person's sense of autonomy and control. Thus, in these cultures, the compassionate ace might be co first assess whether the
blind person needs and wanes help. In the next
section, we describe our own work, which examines how cultural differences in views of negative
emotion influence what constitutes an expression
of compassion.

Affect Valuation Theory: Cultural
D ifferences in Avoided Negative Affect
Verweinen lassc die Nachce mich,
Solang ich weinen mag.
[Lee me pass the nights in rears,
As long as I wane co cry.]
Uohann Wolfgangvon Goethe, 1749-1832;
Goethe, 1827. p. 3 16)

Be still, sad heart! And cease repining;
Behind the clouds is the sun still shining.
(Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. 1807-1882;
Longfellow, 1842, p. 112) '

Mose people wane co feel more positive than negative states, and wane co feel more positive and less negative than they actually feel. And yet, people Yary in
the specific positive states chat they wane co feel (e.g.,
Tsai et al., 2006) , as well as in their desire co avoid
negative emotions (Koopmann-Holm &Tsai, 2014).
Affect valuation theory (AVT) incorporates chis variation into models of affect and emotion. Although
most of our research has focused on cultural and individual variation in the affective states chat people ideally wane co feel (their "ideal affect") (e.g., D . Jiang,
Fung, Sims, Tsai, & Zhang, 2015; Koopmann-Holm,
Sze, Ochs, &Tsai, 2013; B. Park, Tsai, Chim, Blevins,
& Knutson, 2016; Sims & Tsai, 2015; Tsai, 2007;
Tsai er al., 2016; Tsai er al., 2006; Tsai, Louie, Chen,
& Uchida, 2007; Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007; Tsai,
Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007), our recent research demonstrates chat the premises of AVT also extend co
the affective scares chat people wane co avoid feeling
("avoided affect") (Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014) .
In chis chapter, we will primarily focus on chis new
research, but we will discuss how compassion might
be influenced by ideal affect at the end of chis chapter.
The first premise of AVT postulates char how
people actually feel (their "actual affect") often differs from how they ideally wane co feel (their "ideal

affect") and how they wane co avoid feeling (their
"avoided affect"). As mentioned above, most people wane co avoid feeling negative scares. Of course,
there may be specific situations in which avoided
affect includes positive scares. For example, people
might cry co avoid being coo excited about a possible opportunity in order co minimize their disappoi ntment if chat opportunity does not arise.
However, in Western contexts like the United
States and Germany, people wane co avoid negative more than positive affective states (KoopmannHolm & Tsai, 2014). While there may be times
when people cannot avoid feeling these negative
scares, people are often successful at not feeling the
scares they wane to avoid scares (Koopmann-Holm
&Tsai, 2014) . Moreover, structural equation modeling demonstrates char actual, ideal, and avoided
negative affect are distinct constructs in the U .S.
and Germany (Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014) .
In ocher words, actually feeling negative scares, ideally wanting to feel negative states, and wanting co
avoid feeling negative scares are separate aspects of
our emotional lives.
The second premise of AVT predicts chat culture
shapes ideal and avoided affect more than it does
actual affect, whereas temperament shapes actual
affect more than it does ideal and avoided affect.
Rozin (2003) and Shweder (2003) argue char cultural factors shape what people view as desirablegood, moral, and virtuous; and by extension, what
they view as undesirable-bad, immoral, and sinful. Similarly, AVT predicts chat cultural factors
should shape what affective scares people view as
desirable and undesirable. Although cultural factors
also shape what affective scares people actually feel
(Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Mesquita
& Markus, 2004), decades of empirical research suggest char, across cultures, actual affect is primarily
shaped by people's temperament (Costa & McCrae,
1980; David, Green, Marcin, & Suls, 1997; Diener
& Lucas, 1999; Gross, Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998;
Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; McCrae, Cosca, &
Yik, 1996; Rusting & Larsen, 1997; Schimmack,
Radhakrishnan, Oishi, Dzokoco, & Ahadi, 2002;
Tsai et al. , 2006), as well as their regulatory abilities
and immediate circumstances (e.g., Gross, 1998) .
In support of chis prediction, across three studies,
we observed char, on average, European Americans
wanted co avoid feeling negative scares more than
Germans did. Thus, although most people want co
avoid negative scares, there are cultural differences
in the degree co which people want co avoid feeling
negative. In contrast, culcural differences in actual
KOOPMANN-HOLM AND TSAI
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negative affect were not as strong or reliable across
studies (Koopmann-Holm &Tsai, 2014).

American- German Differences in Avoided
Negative Affect
These observed differences in avoided negative
affect are supported by historical accounts and personal anecdotes. For instance, in American Cool, historian Peter Stearns states that, in American society,
"fear and anger had no positive function ... ; rather
than being directed, they were to be avoided as
fully as possible" (Stearns, 1994, p. 96). In Against
Happiness, Wilson describes the first American settlers as extremely optimistic people who avoided
sadness by moving to the "Promised Land": "They
thought that they would on the American shore
discover true happiness and put most sadness to
rout" (Wilson, 2008, p. 11). Similarly, McAdams
describes the key feature of contemporary American
identity as "the transformation of personal suffering into positive-affective life scenes that serve to
redeem and justify one's life" (McAdams, 2004,
p. 96), as reflected in American storytelling, which
characteristically has positive endings. Indeed, in
Bright-Sided, Ehrenreich (2009) describes how she
was scolded, reprimanded, and told to seek professional help by other breast cancer patients when she
expressed her anger and anxiety about her diagnosis.
As suggested by Ehrenreich's experiences, Held and
Bohart describe how American culture views "negativity, complaining, pessimism" as sinful (Held &
Bohart, 2002, p. 961).
In contrast, in his book Ein Jahr Holle [One Year
of Hell], Michael Lesch, a German actor, describes
his battle with cancer as "horrible," and full of
anxiety, horror, and shock (Lesch, 2008). Indeed,
German culture is often described as being melancholic and pessimistic, as the terms Weltschmerz
and Angst suggest (Clair, 2005; Gelfert, 2005). This
is reflected by the Sturm und Drang ("storm and
drive") movement in German literature and music
in the eighteenth century, which was characterized
by the free expression of extreme positive and negative emotions. In this movement, negative emotions
were not only accepted, but also glorified.
Previous empirical work supports these historical, ethnographic, and personal accounts of
American-German differences as well. For instance,
German scholar Hedderich ( 1999) conducted semistructured interviews with American and German
employees, who had spent at least six months in
the other country. He asked them about differences
between the cultures and concluded that, compared
278

to Germans, Americans resist talking about their
failures, indirectly referring to them as "items for
improvement" (Hedderich , 1999, p. 161), and
instead praise each other for their achievements. In
line with chis, Friday (1989) compared German and
American discussion styles among colleagues within
one corporation, and found that Germans were
more likely to be forceful compared to Americans.
Similarly, Koopmann-Holm and Matsumoto
(2011) found differences in emotional display rules,
with German display rules allowing the expression
of anger and sadness more than American display
rules. Together, these findings support our findings
that people in American contexts want to avoid
negative states more than do people in German
con rexes.
Where might these cultural differences stem
from? American culture endorses a "frontier spirit"
(i.e., achieving one's goals, influencing one's circumstances, overcoming nature) more than German
culture does (Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014) .
Early American settlers went to the New World to
escape their negative circumstances and improve
their lives, and as a result, they may have created a
culture in which individuals want to avoid the negative. In contrast, the ancestors of today's Europeans
stayed in their homeland and had to adjust to their
negative life circumstances. These individuals may
have created a culture that endorses greater acceptance of the negative. Indeed, we observed that
because American culture endorses frontier spirit
values (i.e., valuing achievement over nature) more
than German culture does, Americans want to
avoid negative emotions more than their German
counterparts do (Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014,
Study 3).

I

Implications for Compassion
The third premise of AVf is that people's desire
to avoid negative states drives their behavior. In
their control-theory of behavior, Carver and Scheier
(1998) argue that most behaviors are directed
towards goals or away from anti-goals, and are
regulated by discrepancy-reducing or discrepancyenlarging feedback systems, respectively. Whereas
discrepancy-reducing systems bring organisms closer
to their goals, discrepancy-enlarging processes move
organisms farther from their "anti-goals." We propose that avoided negative affect aces like an "antigoal"; therefore, people act in ways that actively
distance them from the negative states they want
to avoid. For instance, the more someone wants to
avoid negative affect, the more likely that person
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Figure 21.2 D epiction of a prototypical America n (left) and G erman (ri ght) sympathy card.

may be to avert the gaze from someone who is suffering (e.g., a homeless person asking for money) for
fear that the person who is suffering may make them
feel bad. Some preliminary data support this prediction: when presented with one image that could
either be perceived as a suffering face, a laughing
face, or both, the more participants wanted to avoid
feeling negative affect, the more likely they were to
report seeing only the laughing face (KoopmannHolm, Bartel, Bin Meshar, & Yang, in preparation).
These findings suggest that cultural differences in
( avoided negative affect may have consequences for
the experience of compassion. For instance, because
/ people must perceive another's suffering before they
can experience compassion, it is possible that the
more individuals want to avoid negative affect, the
less likely they may be to put themselves in situations in which they might observe the suffering
of another person. The less likely people are to see
other people's suffering, the fewer opportunities
they have to experience compassion.
Furthermore, avoided negative affect may play a
role in how people express their sympathy or compassion for another. In cultures that encourage people to avoid negative states more, people may find
responses that focus more on the positive and less
on the negative as more helpful and compassionate.
However, in cultures that encourage people to avoid
negative states Less, people may find responses that
acknowledge the negative more and foc us on the
positive less to be more helpful and compassionate.
To test this hypothesis, we compared the emotional
content of a representative sample of American
and German sympathy cards sold in American and
German card stores. We examined these cultural
products because they are specifically designed as a
way of responding to others' suffering. In both the
United States and Germany, people send sympathy cards to show their concern and compassion to
others. Supporting our hypothesis, we found that

I

American cards contained more posmve words,
more living images, fewer negative words, and fewer
dying images than did German cards (see Figures
21.2 and 21.3) :
To further test our hypotheses regarding culture,
compassion, and avoided negative affect, we asked
European American and German participants to
imagine that the father of one of their acquaintances
had just died, and that their acquaintance was very
sad. We then presented them with three pairs of
sympathy cards. Each pair contained one card that
focused more on the negative (e.g. , ''A severe loss .. .
take time to grieve") and one card that focused
more on the positive (e.g., "Remembering . .. let
time heal your soul"). As predicted, Americans felt
less comfortable sending sympathy cards that contained primarily negative content than Germans
did, and these differences were mediated by cultural .
differences in avoided negative affect. Whereas 72%
of Germans chose at least one negative card from
the three pairs presented, only 37% of European
Americans did (Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014).
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American and German sympathy cards.
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Because these data were correlarional, we
conducted another study in which we used an
experimental design ro examine whether rhe
tendency ro want to avoid negative affect more
caused greater choice of positive versus negative
cards (Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014, Study 4).
American and German participants were randomly assigned to either "avoid negative affect"
or "approach negative affect" conditions. In rhe
"avoid negative affect" condition, participants
were cold ro push a joystick away from themselves
when they saw a negative (vs. neutral) image on a
computer screen. In rhe "approach negative affect"
condition, participants were told ro pull a joystick
cowards themselves when they saw a negative (vs.
neutral) image on a computer screen. Afterwards,
they were presented with the scenario in which
they had ro choose a card ro send ro someone who
had just lost a loved one. Overall, participants in
the "avoid negative affect" condition preferred
sympathy cards with positive content more (and
cards with negative content less) than those in rhe
"approach negative affect" condition. These findings suggest char differences in avoided negative
affect at least partially drive different responses ro
suffering.
Do the same differences emerge when people are
suffering themselves? To answer this question, we
asked participants ro "Please imagine char one of
your loved ones just died .... Imagine char you just
received a sympathy card from one of your acquaintances." We then presented participants with two
pairs of different sympathy cards. As described
above, there was one negative and one positive card
for each pair. We rhen asked participants ro report
how comforting and helpful they found each card.
As predicted, Americans raced the negative cards
as less comforting and helpful than did Germans.
When asked which type of card they would rather
receive, only 16% of European Americans chose ac
least one our of two negative cards, whereas 38%
of Germans chose at least one our of two negative
cards. Again, these cultural differences were parrly
due ro differences in the desire ro avoid negative
stares: rhe more individuals wanted to avoid negative scares, the less comforting and helpful they
found rhe negative cards (Koopmann-Holm,
Bruchmann, Pearson, Oduye, Mann, & Fuchs, in
preparation) .
Together, these findings suggest char people
express compassion differenrly across culcures, and
people differ in which compassionate responses they
view as helpful.
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Implications for Counseling, Health Care,
Public Service, and Intervention
Our work suggests char behaviors char are
regarded as compassionate in one culture may nor
be in another. Focusing on rhe positive may seem
superficial in a German context, whereas focusing
on rhe negative may seem discouraging and even
morbid in an American context. Furthermore, our
findings suggest char American dominant models
of compassion and empathy might nor apply in
German contexts and ocher contexts in which people wane ro avoid negative affect less. Indeed, rhe
two most famous models explaining compassionate
responding, che empathy-altruism hypo thesis by
Barson and colleagues (1981, 1983; 1991) and the
negative state relief model by Cialdini and colleagues
(1973), assume that people do nor want ro feel negative emotions. The empathy-altruism hypothesis
suggests char rhe more distress people feel when
seeing someone suffer, rhe Less they help, _because
people do not want ro feel char distress. Because
Americans want to avoid feeling negative more than
Germans, actually feeling negative/distressed might
interfere with helping more for Americans than
Germans. The negative stare relief model suggests
char when someone is distressed because another
person is suffering, this distress leads ro more helping behavior, because people want ro improve their
own mood (i.e., reduce their distress) by helping
someone else. While Americans might help others
ro reduce their own distress, Germans might be less
inclined ro reduce their own distress, because they
are more accepting of negative emotion. Thus, the
motivation ro reduce one's own distress might be
less relevant in German contexts for compassionate
responses to occur.
..;
Our findings provide just one ~ample of how
culture might shape che expression of compassion.
Understanding culcural differences in compassion is
important for several reasons. First, understanding
cultural differences in compassion may be critical
ro developing effective cross-cultural counseling
(Chung & Bemak, 2002). For instance, grief and
trauma counseling is often organized and provided
internationally, bur ic is often ineffective because it
does not take into account the culrure of the people being counseled (Watters, 2010). Even among
Western clinical therapies, some may be more effective than others, depending on how much individuals want ro avoid negative emotion. For instance,
Sigmund Freud, rhe father of psychoanalysis, was
Austrian and thus influenced by German culcure.
Therefore, the assumption chat suppressing and
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avoiding negative emotions impairs functioning,
and chat one needs to release, accept, and talk about
one's negative emotions as a "cure," might reflect the
German acceptance of negative emotion. In contrast, Aaron Beck, the father of cognitive therapy,
was American. The assumption in cognitive therapy
chat one needs to repair one's negative mood (i.e.,
make it positive) might reflect the American desire
to avoid negative emotion. Indeed, contrary to psychoanalytic thought, repressive coping (i .e., ignoring or suppressing negative thoughts and feelings)
leads to better mental and physical health after the
loss of a loved one in an American sample (Coifman,
Bonanno, Ray, & Gross, 2007), perhaps because it
is consistent with the American value placed on
avoiding negative emotion. Thus, understanding
cultural and individual differences in avoided negative affect might inform therapists and other health
providers how best to respond to another's suffering. While some might prefer to "pass the nights
in tears, as long as [they] wane to cry" as described
by Goethe (1827, p. 316), others might prefer their
heart to "cease repining [because) behind the clouds
is the sun still shining" as described by Longfellow
(1842, p. 112) .
Knowing about cultural differences in compassion may be important not just for counseling
settings, but also for health care and public service, where compassion can lead to better outcomes
(Amador, Flynn, & Betancourt, 2015). For example, in our increasingly multicultural world, it is
important for clinicians to know how to compassionately convey the diagnosis of a terminal illness
to patients and their families. Furthermore, an
awareness of cultural differences in compassion in
educational settings is important for advising students from various cultural backgrounds and might
be an important aspect of "ethnoculcural empathy"
(Wang et al., 2003), or understanding the perspective of an ethnically different person.
Understanding cultural and individual differences in expressions of compassion is also critical
to interventions chat aim to promote compassion,
empathy, sympathy, and altruism in different cultures. For instance, previous studies have demonstrated chat meditation increases compassion (e.g.,
Condon et al. , 2013; Kemeny et al. , 2012; Leiberg
et al., 2011; Weng et al., 2013); however, none of
the studies have examined whether the findings hold
across different ethnic and cultural groups. Indeed,
Layous, Lee, Choi, and Lyubomirsky (2013) demonstrated chat specific happiness interventions
do not seem to be similarly effective in North

American and South Korean contexts. In addition
to studying the effectiveness of interventions in different cultural contexts, researchers should include
measures of compassion chat reflect cultural differences in the conception, experience, and expression
of compassion.

Limitations and Future Research
Our studies have some limitations chat should
be addressed in future research. First, we examined
how avoided negative affect shapes hypothetical
responses to the suffering of an acquaintance; future
studies should examine whether these findings generalize to actual negative events. For example, we are
currently investigating what types of cards are considered most helpful by recently bereaved individuals, as well as how people respond to posts of actual
suffering on Twitter. Future studies should also
examine responses to other individuals (e.g. , the suffering of a family member or friend) and responses
to different types of suffering (e.g. , having AIDS or
cancer, occupational or marital difficulties).
Second, we have only begun to examine cultural differences in compassion and related states
using American (mainly European American) and
German samples. Interestingly, these are two cultures chat are often lumped together as "individualistic and Western." Future studies should examine
expressions of sympathy and compassion in ocher
cultural contexts as well (e.g., Gaines & Farmer,
1986; Grossmann & Kross, 2010).
Third, it would be important to examine how
these cultural differences in compassion affect compassion fatigue. Are people more susceptible to
fatigue when they want to avoid negative affect? Our
data suggest that the desire to want to avoid feeling negative may lead to feeling even more negative
when exposed to negative stimuli (see KoopmannHolm & Tsai, 2014, p. 1109). Therefore, it is possible that people who want to avoid feeling negative
more might show earlier and/or greater signs of
compassion fatigue than people who want to avoid
feeling negative less. Future research should test chis
prediction.
Furthermore, future studies should also examine
how ideal affect (the affective states people ideally
want to feel; Tsai et al., 2006) might shape compassion. As mentioned above, we have found chat
American culture values excitement states more and
calm states less than many East Asian contexts do
(Tsai et al., 2006) . To the degree that compassionate responses involve positive emotion, people from
cultures chat value excitement states more might
KOOPMANN-HOLM AND TSAI
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find excited responses to be more compassionate, whereas people from cultures that value calm
states more might find calm responses to be more
compassionate.
Another important point that future research
should address is how compassion should be
measured across but also within cultural contexts.
Should we focus our efforts on examining how people respond to someone they relate and feel similar
to as suggested by Western concepts of compassion
(Batson et al., 1981; Batson er al ., 1987)? Or should
we include a Buddhist perspective on compassion
(Dalai Lama, 1997), which emphasizes the interconnectedness of all beings and therefore encourages
compassion towards everyone, including transgressors and adversaries? We argue for the importance
of alternative measures of compassion in order to
understand chis construct from a cross-cultural perspective (Koopmann-Holm, Sze, et al., in preparation). In addition to including the dimension of
extensivity (the quality of including everyone, not
just in-group members, but also transgressors and
adversaries) to compassion, it will also be important to examine compassion from a more collectivise viewpoint as well. For example, group solidarity
includes compassionate acts not necessarily stemming from an individual's emotion and appraisals, but rather from a collective social identity (M.
Gaborit, personal communication, February 19,
2016). Scavrova and Schlosser (2015) define solidarity as "behaviors that are driven by a sense of shared
identity with the disadvantaged and are directed at
improving their conditions" (Stavrova & Schlosser,
2015, p. 2), which is very much in line with the definition of compassion in this Handbook.
Finally, our work has focused on the cultural
shaping of the conceptualizations and expressions
of compassion. More research is needed to examine how these differences shape the experience of
compassion . Our findings suggest chat compassion
is expressed differently, depending on the degree to
which people want to avoid feeling negative emotions. Because compassion is expressed differently,
based on the "cultural construction" view of emotion (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012) , it is possible that
compassion is also experienced differently. Previous
studies suggest that cultural differences exist in how
people experience empathy and altruistic motivation (de Greek et al., 2012; Miller & Bersoff, 1994;
Siu & Shek, 2005) . Our research suggests that people who want to avoid feeling negative may actually
feel more negative when exposed to negative images
(see Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014, p. 1109).
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However, people who want to avoid feeling negative focus more on the positive when responding to
someone's suffering. This might make them actually feel more positively when seeing someone suffer
compared to people who don't want to avoid feeling
negative. For example, when people who want to
avoid feeling negative see someone else's suffering,
they focus on the positive more and thus construe
the situation differently than people who want to
avoid the negative less. They might focus on the
good times a grieving person had with a deceased
loved one, which might lead to an experience of a
"warm glow" when feeling compassionate. For individuals wanting to avoid feeling negative less, they
might focus on the pain the person feels as a result
of having lost a loved one, which might lead to
feeling this pain when feeling compassion. Future
research needs to test this prediction and should
also examine whether feeling more negative while
feeling compassionate erases the positive feelings of
compassion (e.g. , the "warm glow"), or whether the
positive and negative feelings coexist.
Importantly, previous research has documented
clear cultural similarities in compassion . In face,
the core tendency to relate to ochers and respond
to others' suffering might very well be universal,
as Darwin suggests (Darwin, 1871). Even though
we find cultural differences in how people respond
to someone's suffering in European American and
German contexts and in what they regard as helpful, sympathy cards are readily available in both cultures. This suggests that sending a sympathy card to
express one's compassion occurs frequently enough
for these cultural products to exist, suggesting cultural similarities in compassion. However, our work
demonstrates that the motivations that follow chis
initial emotional tendency to be compassionate and
to want to help (i.e., whether people focus on the
positive or negative) are shaped by culture.
In conclusion, although Darwin might have been
correct in proposing that the tendency to feel compassion is basic and instinctual, it is clear that there
are differences across cultures in the conception,
experience, and expression of compassion. Here we
demonstrate that cultural differences in the degree
to which people want to avoid negative emotions
predicts how people respond to ochers' suffering
as well as people's preferences for how they would
like others to respond to their own suffering (i.e.,
what they regard as most helpful and compassionate). The more people want to avoid negative affect,
the more they focus on the positive (vs. negative)
when responding to others' suffering, and the more
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they wan t others to focus on the positive (vs. negative) when expressing compassion toward their own
suffering. Our hope is that in the future, increasing
research will reveal the other ways in which culture
shapes the conception, experience, and expression
of compassion .
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